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Chapter pages in book: (1 - 23)Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) are entities or institutions that inter-
pose themselves between workers and ﬁ  rms to facilitate, inform, or regulate 
how workers are matched to ﬁ  rms, how work is accomplished, and how 
conﬂ  icts are resolved. In the textbook competitive model of the labor mar-
ket, LMIs do not exist—nor is there any need for them. If information is 
complete and markets are competitive, theory suggests that decentralized, 
atomistic labor markets are hard to improve upon.
Economists have long recognized that labor markets deviate substantially 
from this neoclassical benchmark. Sumner Slichter (1950) observed more 
than ﬁ  fty years ago that the “law of one price” did not appear to hold in 
labor markets; seemingly identical workers earned markedly diﬀerent wages 
depending upon what industry they labored in.1 H. Greg Lewis (1986) dem-
onstrated in the 1970s that membership in a labor union conferred sub-
stantial wage beneﬁ  ts, underscoring that atomistic wage setting is far from 
universal. Akerlof (1970) showed that a small amount of private informa-
tion in markets may be suﬃcient to thwart trade entirely. Shortly thereafter, 
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1. This ﬁ  nding was corroborated by, among others, Krueger and Summers (1988) and Katz 
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Spence (1973) identiﬁ  ed a set of conditions under which employers might 
reward workers for acquiring costly credentials that have no productive 
value. During the 1980s, Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides formalized 
the observation that decentralized labor market search typically leads to a 
market equilibrium with both unﬁ  lled jobs and unemployed workers.2 This 
body of theory and evidence suggests that labor market information is not 
usually complete or symmetric, workers are not typically commodities, ﬁ  rms 
are not always price takers, and in general, there may be scope for third par-
ties—LMIs, in particular—to intercede both to improve the operation of 
the labor market and to proﬁ  t from its imperfections.
The goal of this volume is to oﬀer a conceptual foundation for analyzing 
the roles that these understudied economic actors play in the labor market, 
and to develop a qualitative and, in some cases, quantitative sense of their 
signiﬁ  cance to market operation and worker welfare. The twelve chapters 
in this volume, prepared for and presented at the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Conference on Labor Market Intermediation in May of 
2007, oﬀer novel empirical analyses of a diverse array of LMIs, including 
online job search engines, criminal records providers, public employment 
oﬃces, state regulatory bodies, labor unions, centralized job matching mar-
kets, and temporary help agencies. Although heterogeneous, a central theme 
of this volume is that these intermediaries serve a common role, which is 
to address a set of endemic departures of labor market operation from the 
neoclassical benchmark. The intellectual challenge taken up by the volume 
is to identify and systematically classify these departures, and to consider 
how market and nonmarket actors—workers, ﬁ  rms, public oﬃcials, non-
governmental organizations—adapt to them to improve or to exploit the 
decentralized outcomes that result.
The parsimonious and (I hope) encompassing taxonomy oﬀered by 
this introductory chapter highlights three major deviations of labor mar-
ket operation from the neoclassical benchmark and considers how LMIs 
potentially address—and in some cases, exploit—them. These deviations 
are costly information, adverse selection, and (failures of) collective action. 
This chapter develops this three-  part taxonomy and uses it to illustrate the 
underlying economic forces that connect the twelve chapters in the volume. 
A unifying observation that emerges is that participation in the activities 
or services of a given LMI are typically voluntary for one side of the mar-
ket—workers or employers—and compulsory for the other. I argue that this 
pattern of voluntary and compulsory participation is largely dictated by the 
nature of the market imperfections that LMIs address, and thus can tell us 
much about the roles that intermediaries play in the market. Table 1, which 
categorizes LMIs by market function and the nature of worker and ﬁ  rm 
participation in their activities (voluntary/ compulsory), provides a roadmap 
to the main arguments of the chapter.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 4    David  H.  Autor
Costly Information
In the benchmark neoclassical model of the labor market, it is costless 
for workers and ﬁ  rms to search for each other. In reality, search is costly. 
Workers pay directly for search, through the monetary and psychic costs of 
applying and interviewing for jobs, and indirectly, through foregone work 
or leisure. Employers likewise incur search costs directly—through help- 
wanted advertising, job fairs, and applicant screening and interviewing—
and indirectly through foregone output while vacancies await workers. Since 
information about job vacancies and job-  seekers is in large part a public 
good—in particular, each ﬁ  rm would like to be aware of all job- seekers, and 
each job- seeker would like to be aware of all vacancies—this information is 
likely to be undersupplied by the market.
The ﬁ  rst chapters of this volume portray a set of LMIs that serve as 
“information-  only” intermediaries—entities whose near-  exclusive func-
tion is to aggregate, package, and sell information about job-  seekers and 
job vacancies. The leading example of an information-  only intermediary is 
the online job board, which serves as a clearinghouse for workers seeking 
jobs and jobs seeking workers. The chapter by Nakamura, Shaw, Freeman, 
Nakamura, and Pyman provides an analytic perspective on how the business 
of online job search functions—how ﬁ  rms use it, how workers use it, and 
how online search ﬁ  rms proﬁ  t from the process.
While at their most basic level, job boards merely post lists of job- seekers 
and job vacancies, Nakamura et al. outline how the business of online job 
boards has evolved greatly from this rudimentary help-  wanted function. 
Large job boards—like Monster.com, CareerBuilder.com, and Hotjobs.
yahoo.com—increasingly provide an outsourced personnel recruitment 
function for large employers, hosting the employment sections of their cor-
porate websites, contacting potential candidates en masse, accepting and 
prescreening resumes, tracking applications, and providing access to an 
exclusive set of candidates. For example, students of elite universities are 
given privileged access to these sites as they near the completion of their 
studies.3 A key point made by Nakamura et al. is that, by making it easier for 
employers to identify potential candidates among those currently employed 
(“passive seekers”) and simultaneously lowering workers’ costs of engaging 
in on- the- job search, job boards may particularly advantage employed rela-
tive to nonemployed job-  seekers.4
The chapter by Stevenson complements this analytic overview by provid-
ing an initial empirical analysis of how the Internet may be changing job 
3. A related paper by Kroft and Pope (2007) provides evidence on the degree to which online 
job engines, Craigslist in particular, have displaced the traditional newspaper help-  wanted 
business.
4. Kugler and Saint Paul (2004) consider how the imposition of ﬁ  ring costs in the presence 
of worker adverse selection diﬀerentially disadvantages nonemployed relative to employed 
job- seekers.Introduction    5
search behavior in the United States. Stevenson documents that the variety 
of job search methods used by unemployed U.S. workers has increased sig-
niﬁ  cantly over the last decade, coincident with the rapid rise in Internet pen-
etration. Moreover, in U.S. states where Internet penetration has risen the 
most, the unemployed appear increasingly likely to use job advertisements 
for seeking and contacting employers directly—suggesting that online and 
oﬄine search may be complements. Consonant with the observations by 
Nakamura et al., Stevenson shows that the vast majority of workers using 
the Internet to gather information about employment are those who are 
already employed. Logically, workers who use the Internet for job search 
are more likely to leave their current employer. It is plausible—though far 
from certain—that online job search may increase the rate at which workers 
change jobs.5
Mitigating Adverse Selection
While pure “information-  only” intermediaries address an important 
public goods problem, this category of LMI is relatively narrow and, I would 
argue, less consequential than the bulk of the LMIs discussed in the follow-
ing. The reason is that where information is costly, the central economic 
problem is typically not exclusively costly information but also asymmetric 
information. Speciﬁ  cally, if information about the quality of workers or jobs 
is incomplete, better-  informed market actors have an incentive to exploit 
their informational advantage to the detriment of less-  informed market 
actors. As ﬁ  rst outlined by Akerlof (1970), these information asymmetries 
readily generate a market equilibrium where lower quality market actors 
(workers or ﬁ  rms) exert negative externalities on their higher quality coun-
terparts, depressing both the quantity and quality of trade.
While job boards might appear to oﬀer a powerful mechanism to bolster 
aggregate labor market eﬃciency, qualitative and quantitative evidence sug-
gests that job boards do not reach this potential. An analysis of U.S. job 
search data by Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) ﬁ  nds that workers who use the 
Internet to search for jobs fare no better—and perhaps worse—than observ-
ably similar workers who do not search for jobs using the Internet. Their 
analysis suggests that either Internet job search is ineﬀective at reducing 
unemployment durations or Internet job searchers are negatively selected 
on unobservables. One recruiting executive, quoted in Autor (2001b), lends 
informal support to the latter hypothesis, asserting that job boards are popu-
lated by four adversely selected pools: “The unhappy (and thus probably not 
a desirable employee); the curious (and therefore likely to be a ‘job- hopper’); 
5. If the Internet provides incumbent workers with better information about their outside 
opportunities, these workers do not need to change jobs to beneﬁ  t. Websites like greedyassoci-
ates.com, for example, which publicize the salary oﬀers made to newly minted attorneys, may 
serve to homogenize the distribution of law ﬁ  rm associate wages.6    David  H.  Autor
the unpromotable (probably for a reason); and the unemployed (probably 
for a worse reason)” (32).
The core problem facing job boards—reﬂ  ected in the preceding quota-
tion—is that workers posting their resumes and credentials online face a 
strong incentive to conceal or slant information to make themselves more 
attractive to potential employers. Recognizing this, employers are likely to 
treat information posted to job boards with skepticism. If in equilibrium, 
employers view the information on job boards as untrustworthy, these 
boards can do little more than provide employers with names and numbers, 
leaving them to discover essential information about worker skills and quali-
ﬁ  cations through other mechanisms such as interviews, background checks, 
and job references.
A natural solution to this asymmetric information problem is compulsory 
disclosure; if job-  seekers can be compelled to reveal information that they 
would not necessarily disclose voluntarily, this could substantially improve 
the eﬃciency of job search and matching—though clearly not all workers 
would beneﬁ  t. Though compulsory disclosure sounds diﬃcult to achieve 
in real world labor markets, chapters 3 and 4 study two labor market inter-
mediaries that perform exactly this function: reducing worker-  side adverse 
selection by, implicitly or explicitly, compelling job applicants to reveal 
information that they might otherwise conceal.
A key piece of information that employers may seek to ascertain is crim-
inal history. As chapter 3 by Keith Finlay reveals, almost 20 percent of 
black males and more than 10 percent of white males in recent U.S. youth 
cohorts have been incarcerated by age twenty-  four. Historically, criminal 
background checks have been comparatively expensive to perform and not 
particularly reliable. Between 1998 and the present, however, more than 
a dozen U.S. states placed their criminal history records databases online 
for use by employers and other interested parties. Implicitly, job-  seekers 
applying for jobs in “open records” states are now compelled to submit to 
a criminal background check at the employer’s discretion. The opening of 
criminal records therefore functions as a publicly operated LMI that may 
in theory reduce worker-  side adverse selection.
How does this opening aﬀect labor market operation in practice? Work-
ing from a simple statistical discrimination framework, Finlay hypothesizes 
that if employers do not initially observe applicants’ criminal histories and 
instead attempt to infer them based on other observable characteristics 
(such as education, age, gender, and race), the opening of criminal records 
should diminish the labor market prospects of ex-  oﬀenders while poten-
tially beneﬁ  ting non-  oﬀenders who might otherwise be viewed as poten-
tial criminals. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 
(NLSY) 1997 Cohort, Finlay ﬁ  nds support for the ﬁ  rst proposition. Young 
adults with criminal histories face reduced employment odds and lower 
wages after states make criminal histories available online. There is less Introduction    7
evidence, however, that young adults without criminal records who appear 
demographically similar to potential criminals fare better once criminal 
records are opened. This result may indicate that employers underestimate 
the prevalence of criminality in the absence of open criminal records—and 
hence, opening of criminal records impedes applicants who are revealed to 
be oﬀenders without beneﬁ  ting those who are revealed to be non- oﬀenders. 
As Finlay cautions, however, the relatively small NLSY 97 sample provides 
insuﬃcient power to detect the diﬀuse beneﬁ  ts hypothesized to accrue to 
the non-  oﬀender population. What appears unambiguous is that open-
ing of criminal records does diminish the labor market prospects of 
ex- oﬀenders.
Although both online job postings and online criminal records potentially 
serve to reduce search costs in labor markets, the crucial distinction between 
these LMIs from the perspective of this chapter lies in the nature of informa-
tion disclosure. Users of job boards may reveal, disclose, or simply fabricate 
information at will. Job applicants in “open records” states have no say in 
whether their criminal backgrounds are made publicly available. It appears 
plausible that this distinction explains why open records have real bite: they 
credibly supply information about worker credentials that applicants might 
otherwise conceal.
The chapter by Bagues and Labini studies an unusual job search engine, 
AlmaLaurea, which also has this compulsory revelation feature. Founded in 
1994 by an interuniversity consortium of Italian universities, AlmaLaurea 
was set up to increase the frequency of successful school- to- work transitions 
among Italian university graduates, which have been astonishingly low in 
recent decades. What distinguishes AlmaLaurea from most electronic job 
boards it that it provides detailed administrative records on participants’ 
courses of study, grades obtained, and rank in class. Moreover, it provides 
this information for almost the entire set of students currently graduating 
from the universities in the consortium. In eﬀect, AlmaLaurea oﬀers the 
university equivalent of open records for job applicants: a college transcript, 
a class ranking, and, implicitly, a comparison of each applicant to his or her 
immediate peers.
A thoroughgoing empirical analysis by Bagues and Labini oﬀers compel-
ling evidence that AlmaLaurea reduced the nonemployment rate of gradu-
ates of AlmaLaurea member universities. Speciﬁ  cally, comparing changes 
in the nonemployment rate of graduates of universities joining AlmaLaurea 
over 1998 to 2001 relative to graduates of universities that had not yet joined 
during this period suggests that AlmaLaurea reduced the nonemployment 
rate of AlmaLaurea graduates by several percentage points, which is con-
siderable. Because Italian labor market conditions were rapidly improving 
during the time period studied, there is room for concern that the diﬀerence- 
in- diﬀerence approach employed might be unreliable. Bagues and Labini 
do much to allay this concern, including conducting placebo tests of the 8    David  H.  Autor
AlmaLaurea treatment in the pretreatment period, and exploiting a second 
wave of AlmaLaurea roll-  outs to conﬁ  rm the main ﬁ  nding.
The AlmaLaurea study leaves open two questions that subsequent re-
search will want to address. First, did the reduction in unemployment of 
AlmaLaurea graduates come in part at the expense of other potential work-
ers? Intuition might suggest yes, but initial analysis by Bagues and Labini 
suggests otherwise. Alternatively, if AlmaLaurea primarily expanded the 
total employment roster, what does this imply about the magnitude of search 
costs or adverse selection in the Italian labor market absent AlmaLaurea? A 
second question ripe for study is whether AlmaLaurea resulted in a redistri-
bution of opportunities among job candidates within member institutions. 
Since AlmaLaurea was built to facilitate direct comparisons among candi-
dates from member universities, it is plausible that it produced both winners 
and losers—improving opportunities for the most distinguished students 
and reducing them for the least distinguished.6
Adverse selection is not, of course, limited to the worker side of the labor 
market. Firms may equally face incentives to exploit asymmetric informa-
tion, to the detriment of workers and customers. The chapter by Woong Lee 
confronts the problem of adverse selection of ﬁ  rms—in particular, ﬁ  rms 
that are themselves LMIs. Lee’s chapter provides an original empirical anal-
ysis of the rise of U.S. Public Employment Oﬃces (PEOs) at the turn of the 
twentieth century. At that time, the services of private, for-  proﬁ  t employ-
ment agencies were widely sought by job-  seekers, particularly by unskilled 
workers and migrants. The lack of sophistication of these job- seekers, how-
ever, left them vulnerable to exploitation. Some of the abuses perpetrated 
by for-  proﬁ  t employment agencies included sending job-  seekers to distant 
locations where no work existed, colluding with employers to provide appli-
cants with only temporary work stints followed by summary discharge, and 
(occasionally) sending unwitting female job-  seekers to brothels. Thus, for- 
proﬁ  t employment agencies appear to have heavily exploited precisely the 
information asymmetries they were purported to resolve.
For U.S. state governments facing this predicament, several remedies were 
conceivable, including regulating and licensing for- proﬁ  t employment agen-
cies or banning them outright. The approach pursued by the states, however, 
was ingenious. Rather than attempting to directly curtail the behavior of 
abusers, states chose to eﬀectively compete them out of business by oﬀering 
high-  quality employment assistance services at Public Employment Oﬃces 
at no cost to job- seekers. This response seems to reﬂ  ect a pinpoint diagnosis 
of the market failure and its remedy. By introducing competition between 
for- proﬁ  t LMIs and reputable public sector LMIs, states likely drove many 
of the lowest-  quality PEOs out of business. What was left behind, presum-
6. This outcome would also be consonant with the reasoning of the Finlay study.Introduction    9
ably, were PEOs that oﬀered suﬃcient value- added to justify a positive price 
despite the presence of a reputable, zero-  cost competitor.
The chapter by Dick Todd and Morris Kleiner considers another example 
of a public response to a perceived failure of intermediation, in this case 
by mortgage brokers. Mortgage brokers are for-  proﬁ  t agents (individuals 
or ﬁ  rms) that match potential mortgage borrowers with lenders and assist 
borrowers in completing the loan origination process. These brokers were 
insigniﬁ  cant in the mortgage market in 1980, but by 2004 were involved in 
approximately 68 percent of all mortgages originated. Coinciding with their 
rapid growth was a rise in public concern that market failures prevented 
competition from eﬀectively disciplining brokers’ quality of service.7 As 
mortgage brokering grew, numerous states passed laws requiring brokers 
to post surety bonds or maintain a minimum net worth in order to operate. 
These requirements potentially work to ensure that borrowers have ﬁ  nancial 
recourse if brokers are malfeasant. In addition, because sellers of surety 
bonds would be expected to charge risky brokers a higher price, bonding 
requirements create an entry barrier that is potentially more onerous for 
low-  quality than high-  quality mortgage brokers.
Consistent with this reasoning, Kleiner and Todd show that bonding 
requirements reduced mortgage broker employment, curtailed subprime 
loan originations, and increased the observed qualiﬁ  cation levels (measured 
by education and experience) of brokers operating in the mortgage broker 
occupation. Interestingly, however, Kleiner and Todd also ﬁ  nd that bonding 
requirements increased mortgage foreclosure rates and raised the probability 
that newly originated loans were high priced relative to other loans with 
similar characteristics. While Kleiner and Todd advise caution in interpret-
ing these adverse impacts, they note that they are consistent with the inﬂ  uen-
tial arguments of Friedman (1962) that occupational licensing requirements 
dampen market discipline and produce artiﬁ  cial scarcity, leading to higher 
fees for providers and lower quality for consumers.8
While mortgage brokers are arguably product market rather than labor 
market intermediaries, they have much in common with the for-  proﬁ  t 
employment oﬃces studied by Woong Lee. Both employment oﬃces and 
mortgage brokers serve to match individuals on one side of the market 
(workers or borrowers) to sellers on the other side (employers or mortgage 
lenders). The role played by these intermediaries is a natural market response 
to the problem posed by costly search. There is, however, an adverse selection 
problem that intrinsically arises in this setting: intermediaries that are in the 
7. This concern was exacerbated by the fact that mortgage brokers dominated the origination 
of so-  called subprime mortgages—that is, loans to borrowers who would not be considered 
creditworthy by traditional lending standards.
8. For an extensive treatment of this topic, see Kleiner’s (2006) monograph on occupational 
licensing.10    David  H.  Autor
business of selling information are, by nature, better informed about infor-
mation they sell than are the customers they serve. A wealth of theory and 
evidence suggests that markets are unlikely to operate optimally when sellers 
and buyers are not equally informed. As the chapters by Lee and Kleiner 
and Todd suggest, some subset of intermediaries will use their informational 
advantage to exploit rather than to assist customers.
These parallels suggest some general lessons on the mixed role that inter-
mediaries play in reducing information costs in labor markets. Since the 
public good of labor market information is likely to be underprovided by 
the free market, a set of LMIs will ﬁ  nd it proﬁ  table to collect and sell infor-
mation at a cost that job-  seekers could obtain by their own eﬀorts. These 
intermediaries mitigate the underprovision problem. But their informational 
advantage also potentially gives rise to another market failure, which is infor-
mation asymmetry and the attendant risk of adverse selection. Whether this 
asymmetric information problem is moderate or severe depends in part on 
the market structure in which intermediaries operate. In the case of private 
employment agencies at the turn of the twentieth century, these abuses were 
apparently profound. But a change in market structure, fostered by competi-
tion between public and private- sector providers, substantially mitigated the 
problem. In the case of mortgage brokers, it is less certain that the regula-
tory remedy—creating barriers to entry—provided the structural change 
needed.
In both cases, it is signiﬁ  cant that the policy response to adverse selection 
included forcible public intervention in the market: an injection of competi-
tion in the case of Public Employment Oﬃces and the imposition of bonding 
requirements in the case of mortgage brokers. These examples reinforce the 
general observation that, to address signiﬁ  cant market imperfections, LMIs 
must be capable of changing the incentives faced by at least one set of market 
agents, typically workers or ﬁ  rms.
Solving Collective Action Problems
Providing information—even compelling it—is not necessarily suﬃcient 
to resolve market failures. Notifying a bank’s deposit holders that the insti-
tution faces a small risk of insolvency does not make a run on the bank less 
likely—rather, it spurs each depositor to withdraw his or her funds, thus 
ensuring collapse. In such cases, rational agents acting with full information 
and accurate expectations about one another’s actions make decisions that 
are privately optimal yet collectively suboptimal. There is potential in such 
settings for market intermediaries to improve on competitive outcomes. But 
this is only feasible if these intermediaries have teeth—or, more speciﬁ  cally, 
the power to change payoﬀs so that the maximizing choices of actors on one 
or both sides of the market also serve the common good.
The chapters by Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth and by Richard Free-Introduction    1 1
man and Marit Rehavi consider two such intermediaries. Niederle and Roth 
analyze the labor market for medical fellowships (post-  residency training) 
in the specialty of gastroenterology. Unraveling is widespread in entry- level 
labor markets for highly specialized positions, including legal clerkships and 
medical specialties. Candidates in these ﬁ  elds often sign binding employ-
ment contracts one or more years prior to the start of work—well before the 
quality of job matches can be reliably assessed. And job oﬀers are frequently 
made with short (exploding) decision deadlines and substantial professional 
penalties for reneging. The allocative eﬃciency of such a matching process 
is likely to be poor.
The Niederle and Roth chapter oﬀers a diagnosis of the market failures 
in entry-  level specialty markets and a quantitative analysis of how these 
problems were manifest and subsequently resolved (at least for some time) 
by the LMI of a centralized fellowship match. Niederle and Roth argue that 
the underlying cause of market unraveling is congestion. In occupations 
where most entry-  level candidates enter the labor market simultaneously 
(i.e., as a cohort completes its studies), there is typically insuﬃcient time for 
employers to evaluate and make oﬀers to all relevant candidates before com-
peting oﬀers have already been made and accepted. This congestion spurs 
employers to make time-  limited (exploding) oﬀers to candidates to reduce 
the risk that, should their initial oﬀers be declined, they are left to hire from 
the residual candidate pool. When exploding oﬀers become commonplace, 
employers quickly recognize that they can employ them strategically to make 
job markets artiﬁ  cially thin for their preferred candidates. Speciﬁ  cally, by 
forcing a candidate to make a binding decision before his or her alternative 
oﬀers are known, an exploding oﬀer turns the candidate’s simultaneous deci-
sion problem into a sequential decision problem. Such strategies naturally 
lead to unraveling: anticipating that their competitors will make exploding 
job oﬀers, each employer has an incentive to accelerate its own oﬀers.
A primary implication of Niederle and Roth’s diagnosis is that market 
unraveling could potentially be checked if job oﬀers were eﬀectively delayed 
(or made nonbinding) until candidates and employers had suﬃcient time to 
search over their relevant choice sets. The National Resident Matching Pro-
gram (NRMP), studied by Niederle and Roth, performs this function. The 
NRMP provides a centralized clearinghouse where applicants and employ-
ers submit rank-  ordered lists representing their preferences. Applying a set 
of deferred acceptance algorithms, the NRMP allocates candidates to fel-
lowships.9 Candidates participating in the match are, in theory, not bound 
by job oﬀers initiated prior to the resolution of the match—thus nullifying 
the power of exploding oﬀers to constrain their choices. Employer participa-
9. As the chapter discusses, the results of such a match are stable—that is, there exists no 
applicant- employer pair, not matched to one another, who would prefer each other to their cur-
rent match. Moreover, it is generally (though not always) incentive-  compatible for applicants 
to submit their true preferences to the clearinghouse.12    David  H.  Autor
tion in the match is voluntary, however, and the value of participation will 
depend positively on the fraction of competitors who are also participating.
A compelling feature of Niederle and Roth’s quantitative case study of 
the gastroenterology (GI) market is that the profession adopted a central-
ized match in 1989 in response to widespread signs of market malfunc-
tion, but participation in the match began to decline after six years, and 
the match was formally abandoned in 2000. This set of events yields two 
prepost contrasts for quantitative study, one prior to the match’s adoption 
and the other subsequent to its demise. The available evidence suggests that 
the centralized match mitigated some clear market maladies, dramatically 
compressing the highly dispersed timing of job oﬀers (which led to artiﬁ  cial 
thinness) and increasing the mobility of GI residents out of the hospitals 
where they performed their residences (suggesting that the match reduced 
monopsony power among incumbent employers). The chapter also exam-
ines the contentious question of whether the centralized match depressed 
fellowship salaries below competitive levels. Niederle and Roth ﬁ  nd essen-
tially no diﬀerence in salary levels between specialties that use a match and 
those that do not, suggesting that centralized matching does not dampen 
salaries per se. Equally remarkable, however, is that the data reveal almost 
no economically signiﬁ  cant variation in fellowship salary levels or disper-
sion across the fourteen specialties considered. This absence of variation 
raises the question of whether, in addition to congestion, the maladies of 
the fellowship market are in part explained by other noncompetitive factors.
The GI matching market example underscores the potential of a Labor 
Market Intermediary to resolve collective action problems—in this case, 
restraining employers from making early oﬀers. The demise of the GI match 
in 2000, however, suggests that something was amiss. Niederle and Roth 
trace the breakdown of the match to a sudden and substantial falloﬀ in the 
supply of GI fellows spurred by a policy change by the Gastroenterology 
Leadership Council. When the number of fellows fell below the number of 
available fellowship slots in 1996, the temptation for employers to circum-
vent the match to guarantee their supply of labor may simply have become 
overwhelming. And because employer participation in the match was vol-
untary, the matching intermediary had no teeth with which to discipline 
defectors. The match therefore unraveled as initial defections spurred fur-
ther defections, rendering the match irrelevant by 2000. The GI case again 
demonstrates that the ability to compel participation by at least one side of 
the market—and perhaps by both—is a necessary requirement for an LMI 
to redress a market failure—in this case, a collective action failure. The GI 
fellowship match appears to have had this power when the labor market was 
slack, but not when it was tight.
The Freeman and Rehavi chapter, which oﬀers an innovative study of the 
changing shape of labor unions, provides a compelling point of comparison 
to the GI case. While the National Resident Matching Program is an LMI Introduction    1 3
with the power to change market payoﬀs (at least some of the time), labor 
unions are an LMI adapting to the loss of this power. Unions have histori-
cally solved collective action problems among atomistic workers by orga-
nizing collective bargaining, sanctioning employers for misconduct, and 
regulating employers’ hiring and dismissal policies. A key to their ability to 
perform this function in the United States is the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935, which compels employers to bargain collectively with a labor 
union if a majority of the ﬁ  rm’s employees votes for union representation. 
Thus, once a union is established, it holds an eﬀective monopoly on bar-
gaining.
While survey evidence suggests that worker demand for union representa-
tion has increased with time, union density in the United States has fallen 
to almost negligible levels (7.4 percent in 2006). Labor unions have also lost 
their eﬃcacy in the United Kingdom, where the range of issues subject to 
collective bargaining has narrowed. If unions can no longer generate sizable 
member beneﬁ  ts, their ability to build membership and levy dues diminishes, 
reducing their power further. This threatens their viability as an LMI.
Against this backdrop, Freeman and Rehavi study an alternative orga-
nizing model for unions, which they refer to as “open source.” In the open- 
source model, unions are decoupled from workplaces and do not collectively 
bargain. They attract members by oﬀering a package of services such as legal 
advice, group employment beneﬁ  ts (e.g., health insurance), and political lob-
bying on labor issues. Two features of this open-  source model represent a 
radical departure from the traditional labor union mode. First, open- source 
unions lack what is certainly the most eﬀective tool that traditional unions 
possessed for generating member beneﬁ  ts: collective bargaining. Second, 
many of the services that open-  source unions purportedly provide, such as 
lobbying, are nonexcludable public goods. This leaves them highly vulnera-
ble to free- riding, which was essentially impossible when union membership 
and compulsory dues paying were preconditions for participation in collec-
tive bargaining. This open-  source model will sharply limit the membership 
fees that such unions can charge.
Despite these threats, Freeman and Rehavi see reasons for tempered opti-
mism about unions’ prospects in the current era. A ﬁ  rst is that the Internet 
has greatly augmented the capability of unions to communicate with poten-
tial members outside of the workplace, and at much lower cost than door- 
to- door canvassing. Moreover, the set of union services that can be provided 
over the Internet has proven to extend beyond mere online replication of 
traditional direct-  mail and fundraising operations. Freeman and Rehavi’s 
creative analysis of question-  and-  answer postings (threads) on the Web 
site of unionreps.org provides a compelling example of a union successfully 
using the Internet to provide a set of tangible, individual-  level member ser-
vices—most signiﬁ  cantly, legal advice on workplace matters.
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union, Working America (a “community- aﬃliate” of the AFL- CIO union), 
which enrolled two million workers between 2004 and 2007 by canvass-
ing at homes and over the Internet. Working America’s success in draw-
ing membership suggests, consistent with survey evidence, that there is 
considerable latent demand for organized labor as a political movement. 
Working America’s direct membership beneﬁ  ts are, however, quite limited 
relative to a traditional labor union, and its fee structure is accordingly 
modest.
If unions are successful in reconstituting under the open-  source model, 
my expectation is that this will reﬂ  ect a profound change in their core func-
tion as Labor Market Intermediaries. Whereas traditional labor unions 
primarily served, in the taxonomy of this chapter, as enforcers of collective 
action, open- source unions appear poised to serve primarily as information- 
provision intermediaries—more akin to job boards than to the medical 
match studied by Niederle and Roth. If the power to compel participation 
is the sine qua non of LMIs that move the market equilibrium, the potential 
of open-  source unions to generate worker beneﬁ  ts that approach those of 
unions of an earlier era is likely to be limited.
Temporary Help Agencies: What Do They Do 
for Workers? What Do They Do to the Market?
More than any other Labor Market Intermediary, the temporary help 
industry has been the subject of intensive recent debate. This is in part due 
to its spectacular growth. In the United States, the temporary help industry 
accounted for 10 percent of net job creation during the decade of the 1990s 
(Autor 2003). In continental Europe and the United Kingdom, temporary 
help agency employment increased its share of average daily employment 
from 1.0 to 1.8 percent between 1986 and 1996. In the same interval, the 
number of workers employed by temporary help agencies more than tripled 
in Germany, Denmark, and Ireland. In Japan, temporary help employment 
grew fourfold following signiﬁ  cant deregulation (International Confedera-
tion of Private Employment Agencies [CIETT] 2007).
Accompanying the growth of temporary help employment has been a 
qualitative change in the type of jobs ﬁ  lled by temporary help agencies. 
Historically, temporary help agency jobs were synonymous with clerical and 
oﬃce work. By 2005, a larger share of temporary help jobs in the United 
States was found in production, transportation, and material moving jobs 
than in clerical or sales occupations.10 As temporary help jobs have moved 
into blue-  collar occupations, the industry has become an increasingly 
10. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http:/  /  www.bls.gov/  news.release/  conemp.toc.htm, accessed 
1/  20/  2008 (based on Current Population Survey February 2005 Contingent Worker Supple-
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important employer of less-  skilled workers. Although it accounts for less 
than 3 percent of average U.S. daily employment, U.S. state administrative 
data show that 15 to 40 percent of former welfare recipients who obtained 
employment in the years following the 1996 U.S. welfare reform took jobs 
in the temporary help sector (Autor and Houseman 2005). Alongside their 
traditional role of ﬁ  lling short-  term staﬃng needs, temporary help jobs are 
increasingly used by employers to screen workers for direct- hire positions at 
arm’s length (temp-  to-  hire) without the attendant risk of litigation should 
the match end badly.
The rapid growth of temporary help employment among low-  skilled 
workers and the increasing prevalence of temp-  to-  perm arrangements has 
spurred an academic and policy debate as to whether temporary help jobs 
facilitate or hinder labor market advancement of job-  seekers. Numerous 
researchers have hypothesized that stints in temporary help employment 
enable workers to develop skills and contacts that eventually lead to stable, 
long-  term employment. Moreover, because temporary help ﬁ  rms face 
uniquely low marginal costs of hiring and ﬁ  ring, these ﬁ  rms may be willing 
to audition candidates who would otherwise have diﬃculty ﬁ  nding direct- 
hire jobs (Abraham 1988; Katz and Krueger 1999; Autor 2001a and 2003; 
Houseman 2001; Autor and Houseman 2002; Houseman, Kalleberg, and 
Erickcek 2003; Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden 2003). But these hypothe-
sized beneﬁ  ts are uncertain. Scholars and practitioners have also argued that 
the unstable and primarily low-  skilled positions available through tempo-
rary help agencies provide little opportunity for workers to develop human 
capital or engage in productive job search (Parker 1994; Pawasarat 1997; 
Jorgenson and Riemer 2000; Benner, Leete, and Pastor 2007). If spells with 
temporary help agencies also inhibit workers from engaging in productive 
job search—after all, job search takes time—temporary help employment 
might hinder workers from obtaining stable jobs.
Distinguishing between these competing hypotheses is a signiﬁ  cant empir-
ical challenge. It is inherently diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate the eﬀects of holding, 
given job types from the skills and motivations that cause workers to hold 
these jobs initially. Four chapters in this volume take steps in this direc-
tion by studying the role that temporary help jobs play in the labor mar-
ket advancement of job-  seekers in Portugal, Germany, and the United 
States.
Before discussing the ﬁ  ndings of these chapters, it is useful to consider 
the temporary help industry through the conceptual lens applied to other 
LMIs—that is, as institutions that potentially redress market imperfec-
tions arising from decentralized job matching between workers and ﬁ  rms. 
The market imperfection to which temporary help ﬁ  rms primarily address 
themselves is the ﬁ  xed cost of job search. Identifying, screening, and hiring 
workers is a ﬁ  xed cost that must be sunk before actual paid work gets done. 
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short shelf life; for example, substituting for an employee who falls ill for a 
week. Temporary help ﬁ  rms sink these ﬁ  xed costs up front by prescreening 
workers and clients. They defray these sunk costs by introducing a wedge 
between the hourly wage billed to the client ﬁ  rm and the hourly wage (and 
other payroll costs) paid to the temporary worker.
Unlike most of the LMIs considered earlier, temporary help agencies 
function on a two- sided voluntary participation model; neither workers nor 
ﬁ  rms are obliged to use their services unless they see gains from doing so. 
From the ﬁ  rm’s perspective, the gain to temporary help arrangements is 
that they convert their ﬁ  xed job search costs into marginal costs by pro-
viding a ready supply of prescreened workers. From the job-  seeker’s per-
spective, temporary help agencies potentially oﬀer immediate short-  term, 
hourly employment with almost no initial, ﬁ  xed investment in job search.11 
In addition, temporary help arrangements facilitate arm’s-  length screen-
ing by allowing ﬁ  rms to audition workers without the attendant ﬁ  xed costs 
of hiring and the legal risks of ﬁ  ring. The possibility of a temp-  to-  perm 
transition also makes temporary help positions more attractive to work-
ers, many of whom report using temporary help as a means of job search 
(Autor 2001a).
These observations—in particular, the fact that temporary help agencies 
rely on voluntary two-  sided participation—immediately suggest that their 
potential to substantially change labor market outcomes for individual work-
ers or ﬁ  rms is likely to be limited; if this were not so, these arrangements 
would either be much less common or much more prevalent. This does not 
imply that temporary help ﬁ  rms neither help nor harm workers (or ﬁ  rms) at 
the margin. Indeed, Autor and Houseman (2005) provide quasiexperimen-
tal evidence that low-  skilled former welfare recipients in the United States 
placed in temporary help agency jobs receive no lasting earnings or employ-
ment beneﬁ  ts from these placements, whereas ex ante identical individuals 
placed in direct-  hire positions accrue substantial earnings gains over the 
course of two to three years following placement. Nevertheless, if temporary 
help agency employment exists in equilibrium alongside other employment 
forms, it is unlikely that temporary help jobs are either strictly dominant or 
strictly dominated by either employment arrangement.
The evidence presented in the ﬁ  nal four chapters of the volume appears to 
corroborate this reasoning, though with many nuances. The study by René 
11. Why, given these eﬃciencies, are the majority of jobs not found through temporary help 
ﬁ  rms? A likely answer is that, due to their informational advantage on both the supply and 
demand side of the labor market, temporary help ﬁ  rms ﬁ  nd it optimal to charge a relatively 
high markup on their services. This markup, estimated at 40 to 60 percentage points above 
the hourly wage paid to the worker (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 1999), provides workers and 
ﬁ  rms with an incentive to circumvent temporary-  help arrangements for longer-  term matches. 
Similarly to mortgage brokers and for-  proﬁ  t employment agencies, temporary-  help agencies 
hold an informational advantage relative to their clients, and, as seen in other examples, this 
gives rise to its own diﬃculties—here, monopsonistic pricing.Introduction    1 7
Böheim and Ana Rute Cardoso uses uniquely detailed, linked worker-  ﬁ  rm 
data from Portugal to analyze whether workers suﬀer a wage penalty either 
while working for temporary help ﬁ  rms or in the two years following entry 
into temporary help employment. As a descriptive matter, their analysis 
conﬁ  rms that workers in temporary help jobs earn about 10 percent less than 
observationally similar workers in nontemporary help (direct- hire) jobs. But 
once person ﬁ  xed-  eﬀects are included to account for unobserved worker het-
erogeneity, this wage penalty disappears or becomes positive. These results 
imply that there is negative self-  selection of workers into temporary help 
jobs in Portugal, a pattern also documented for the United States (Segal 
and Sullivan 1997).12
While Böheim and Cardoso focus primarily on earnings in temporary help 
jobs, the chapters by Carolyn Heinrich, Peter Mueser and Kenneth Troske, 
Frederik Andersson, Harry Holzer and Julia Lane, and Michael Kvasnika 
study the question of whether temporary help jobs augment or inhibit labor 
market advancement over the longer term. Using employment register data 
from Germany, Kvasnicka analyzes whether unemployed job-  seekers who 
take temporary help jobs are more likely to later obtain direct- hire employ-
ment than observationally similar workers who do not take temporary help 
jobs. The analytical tool used in this study is a matching estimator, which 
identiﬁ  es pairs of workers who are observationally similar up to the point 
where one member of the pair obtains a temporary help job. From this point 
of divergence forward, the estimator compares the trajectory of the two 
workers to estimate of the impact of temporary help employment on the 
“treated” relative to the “nontreated” worker over the subsequent four years.
Contrary to many studies of temporary help employment in European 
countries, Kvasnicka’s analysis ﬁ  nds no evidence that temporary help 
employment increases job-  takers’ subsequent rate of direct-  hire employ-
ment over four years. However, the data clearly show that workers who enter 
temporary help employment from unemployment are substantially more 
likely to remain in temporary help jobs over the subsequent four years. Kvas-
nicka concludes that temporary help jobs increase workers’ employment 
and earnings in the temporary help sector without causing any crowd-  out 
of their advancement into direct- hire employment. As with all studies based 
on observational (i.e., nonexperimental) data, one must also consider the 
possibility that the results are in part driven by unobserved diﬀerences in 
skills and motivations among diﬀerent groups of workers. Ultimately, the 
validity of this approach hinges on the assumption that the treatment vari-
able (temporary help job employment) can be treated as randomly assigned, 
conditional on the observable variables used for the matching estimator.
12. Böheim and Cardoso also estimate that workers who have previously held a temporary- 
help job suﬀer no measurable wage penalty when entering direct-  hire employment. Interpre-
tation of this result deserves particular caution, however, since the analysis is conditioned on 
remaining in employment (wages are not otherwise observed).18    David  H.  Autor
Similar in spirit to the Böheim and Cardoso study, the chapter by Anders-
son, Holzer, and Lane estimates a model of worker earnings that includes 
both worker and ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Distinct from Böheim and Cardoso, the 
ﬁ  xed-  eﬀects model in this chapter draws on earnings data from an earlier 
time period, thus making the ﬁ  xed eﬀect more akin to a measure of workers’ 
permanent earnings and ﬁ  rms’ average salaries than a conventional ﬁ  xed- 
eﬀects estimator. A particular strength of the Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 
chapter is its rigorous analysis of the trajectory of employment by sector. 
The chapter explores not only whether workers in temporary help jobs later 
obtain direct-  hire employment, but also whether these jobs are found in 
high-  wage industries and with high-  wage employers. The key result of this 
analysis is that, although workers earn comparatively low wages while in 
temporary help jobs, their subsequent earnings are often relatively high—
but only if they succeed in gaining stable work with direct-  hire employers. 
Consistent with the view that selective ﬁ  rms use temporary help arrange-
ments to screen workers for desirable direct- hire jobs, the chapter documents 
that temporary help workers who successfully transition to stable, direct- 
hire employment often end up employed by relatively high-  wage ﬁ  rms.
A question left open in part by the Andersson, Holzer, and Lane chapter 
is the role played by worker heterogeneity. In particular, for workers who suc-
cessfully transition from temporary help employment to stable, direct-  hire 
jobs, it is diﬃcult to know whether their spells in temporary help employ-
ment were the cause of these successful transitions or primarily a waypoint 
on the route that these workers were navigating. The chapter by Heinrich, 
Mueser, and Troske makes an ambitious eﬀort to assess the importance of 
such self- selection in this context, drawing on recent econometric techniques 
developed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005). Altonji, Elder, and Taber 
show that it is feasible to assess the likely extent of bias stemming from self- 
selection on unobserved variables by measuring the extent of self-  selection 
on observed variables. The key to their approach is the maintained hypothesis 
that self- selection on observables and unobservables is positively correlated. 
Concretely, imagine that in estimating the eﬀect of temporary help employ-
ment on subsequent employment outcomes, a researcher ﬁ  nds that including 
a worker’s educational attainment in the statistical model leads to a substan-
tial increase in the estimated beneﬁ  ts from temporary help employment. This 
pattern would indicate that there is signiﬁ  cant negative self-  selection into 
temporary help employment based on education (an observable variable).13 
Under the assumptions of the Altonji, Elder, and Taber framework, this 
would further imply that selection on unobserved variables, such as latent 
13. Speciﬁ  cally, we take as given that education is strongly positively correlated with earnings 
and other positive labor market outcomes. If adding education to a wage regression raises the 
coeﬃcient on temporary- help employment, this implies that temporary- help employment and 
education are negatively correlated; that is, there is negative self- selection into temporary- help 
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human capital or taste for eﬀort, is also likely to be important. By contrast, if 
the estimates were found to be largely invariant to the exclusion of all subsets 
of observable variables, this would serve as evidence that self-  selection on 
unobservables is unlikely to be important.
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske put these ideas into practice by studying 
the employment and earnings trajectories of individuals in the state of Mis-
souri who sought employment assistance or cash support through one of 
several federal assistance programs. Consistent with prior research by the 
authors (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 2005), the temporary help industry 
plays a uniquely important role as a transitional source of employment 
for low-  skilled job-  seekers. A key ﬁ  nding of their chapter is that stints in 
temporary help employment have little measurable eﬀect on subsequent 
earnings or employment. Yet, consistent with Andersson, Holzer, and Lane, 
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske observe that successful transitions from 
the temporary help sector are critical to workers’ labor market advance-
ment; workers who remain in temporary help employment experience 
long-  run earnings that are substantially below those of workers in other 
sectors.
The major contribution of the Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske chapter 
is their application of the Altonji, Elder, and Taber method to assess the 
likelihood that the causal eﬀects estimated from the observational data are 
spurious. This analysis presents a nuanced picture. For earnings, the Altonji, 
Elder, and Taber test is frequently consistent with the null hypothesis that the 
causal eﬀects estimates are not spurious. For employment, this is less often 
the case. Though these results present a somewhat ambiguous picture, one 
cannot fail to be impressed by the rigor, clarity, and intellectual candor of 
the Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske analysis. Economic knowledge and cred-
ibility would be well served if more researchers subjected their ﬁ  ndings to 
equally rigorous sensitivity testing.
In net, these four chapters, using disparate data sources from three 
diﬀerent industrialized economies, have a clear commonality of conclusions. 
None suggests that temporary help jobs have any lasting negative eﬀect 
on the workers who obtain them. Whether holding these jobs has positive 
eﬀects on worker outcomes relative to what they would have obtained in 
the absence of temporary help employment is less certain. As a descriptive 
matter, many temporary help workers transition from temporary help to 
direct- hire jobs at higher wages. Simultaneously, those who stay behind fare 
relatively poorly. It is a certainty that those who stay behind over the longer 
term are on average adversely selected—that is, their unobserved skills or 
motivation put them at a disadvantage relative to other workers. By the same 
token, those who leave temporary help employment for higher-  paying and 
more durable direct- hire positions are likely positively selected. These coun-
tervailing forces of selection make it diﬃcult to conclude with certainty if the 
causal eﬀect of temporary help employment is positive, or merely neutral, 20    David  H.  Autor
for the subset of workers making successful transitions from temporary help 
to direct-  hire employment.
This set of ﬁ  ndings suggest a relatively benign labor market role for tem-
porary help agencies. Yet there exists substantial suspicion among policy-
makers and social scientists (particularly outside of economics) that tem-
porary help jobs are exploitative, oﬀering below-  market pay and limited 
opportunities for advancement. From where does this suspicion arise? One 
possibility is that because temporary help agencies are for- proﬁ  t LMIs—
unlike, for example, labor unions, public employment agencies, or univer-
sity job placement consortia—they face a pecuniary incentive to minimize 
wages and beneﬁ  ts, and to inhibit workers from obtaining other, potentially 
superior, positions. In this respect, however, temporary help agencies appear 
not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from other employers, and so it is hard to credit 
this viewpoint.
Perhaps a more compelling argument is that widespread use of tempo-
rary help agencies, even if beneﬁ  cial to individual workers and ﬁ  rms, may 
exert a negative externality on the aggregate labor market—that is, it is a 
“public bad.” One case in point for this argument is that temporary- agency 
workers cannot vote in union certiﬁ  cation elections at client ﬁ  rms since, 
for legal purposes, the temporary help agency is their employer of record. 
Moreover, temporary help workers are nearly impossible to organize at their 
temporary help agency oﬃces since they do not perform work at these sites. 
Temporary help arrangements may therefore inhibit collective action that 
would otherwise beneﬁ  t workers. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
some ﬁ  rms use temporary help agencies to illegally screen out potential 
union organizers.14
More broadly, some scholars have argued that the availability of tempo-
rary help agencies encourages employers to pursue a high turnover, low skill- 
investment human resources strategy (see, in particular, Benner, Leete, and Pas-
tor 2007, chapters 1 and 6). Were the LMI of temporary help unavailable, this 
argument suggests that employers would oﬀer better job opportunities with 
greater opportunities for skill acquisition and labor market advancement.15
Because they operate exclusively at the general equilibrium, macroeco-
nomic level, these hypotheses are extremely diﬃcult to test—even more so 
than person- level eﬀects of temporary help employment studied by the four 
chapters in the volume. Moreover, alongside these arguments, one must 
alternatively consider that temporary help agencies may increase aggregate 
labor market eﬃciency and reduce unemployment by diminishing the time 
14. Reﬂ  ecting the natural tensions between temporary help agencies and labor unions, 
Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek (2003) document speciﬁ  c union prohibitions on the use of 
temporary help agency workers at the auto parts manufacturers and hospitals that they study.
15. Kaushik Basu (2003) provides a rigorous discussion of how laissez-  faire bargaining 
among competitive workers and ﬁ  rms over the terms of employment can result in a market 
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workers and ﬁ  rms spend in unproductive search (Katz and Krueger 1999).16 
At this point, one can only conﬁ  dently state that the question of how tem-
porary help employment aﬀects aggregate labor market eﬃciency and the 
quality of jobs available in general equilibrium is of ﬁ  rst-  order importance. 
A compelling answer to this question, however, awaits a suitably ingenious 
research design.
Conclusions
The labor market depicted by undergraduate textbooks is a pure spot 
market, characterized by complete information and atomistic price taking. 
Labor economists have long understood that this model is highly incomplete. 
Search is costly, information is typically imperfect and often asymmetric, 
ﬁ  rms are not always price takers, and atomistic actors are typically unable 
to resolve coordination and collective action failures. In this second- best of 
all worlds, there is scope for third parties to intercede, both to improve the 
operation of the labor market and to proﬁ  t from its imperfections.
One might have speculated that in an era of rapid information ﬂ  ows 
and substantial job mobility, the importance of labor market intermediar-
ies would wane. Indeed, the most prominent LMI—the traditional labor 
union—has been in secular decline for decades. Yet the decline of labor 
unions as an LMI is the exception rather than the rule. Three of the LMIs 
studied in this volume—online search engines, criminal records providers, 
and open- source unions—have only recently emerged. And a fourth—tem-
porary help agencies—has risen from relative obscurity to international 
prominence over the last two decades.
Though recent technological advances have made market informa-
tion more abundant and less expensive, cheap information alone is rarely 
suﬃcient to solve the fundamental problems posed by costly and asym-
metric information, adverse selection, and failures of collective action.17 
Ultimately, the imperfections endemic to decentralized labor markets gener-
ate demand for institutions that can variously compel disclosure of hidden 
information, coordinate the actions of members of a congested market, or 
solve collective action failures among parties with complementary inter-
ests. The Labor Market Intermediaries studied in this volume perform these 
functions, though always imperfectly, and not without attendant costs and 
abuses. Despite widely heralded advances in the technology of job matching, 
16. This positive aggregate beneﬁ  t, if present, does not preclude the possibility that individual 
workers who use temporary-  help agencies fare worse on average than those who do not; that 
is, the public good and the private good may have countervailing eﬀects on individuals, even if 
the public good dominates, on average.
17. Indeed, cheap information can in some cases exacerbate adverse selection by eliminat-
ing the signaling value of formerly costly actions such as submitting job applications (Autor 
2001b).22    David  H.  Autor
it is my strong contention that Labor Market Intermediaries will continue to 
arise to address, ameliorate, and exploit the imperfect environment in which 
workers and employers interact.
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